The following book excerpt is from the recently releasedHacker's Challenge 3 (McGraw-Hill Osborne) by David Pollino, Bill Pennington, Tony Bradley and Himanshu Dwivedi. This chapter presents a situation in which the security of an organization has been compromised.
Industry:
Publishing
Attack Complexity:
Moderate
Prevention Complexity:
Moderate
Mitigation Complexity:
Moderate
Wednesday, November 9, 2005, 15:17
Dillon McCabe had put in six solid years working for Markwell Publishing—half of
them as a one-man IT department. He had essentially pieced the network together
with chewing gum and tin foil when there was no budget at all, and he had put in
80-plus–hour weeks to handle all of the network administration tasks as well as the
technical support issues for the desktop systems. Markwell Publishing owed him.
Dillon had been there through it all since the company was launched. He'd been
through times when he wasn't sure he would be paid at all, and raises and bonuses
were virtually unknown. Now that Markwell Publishing had survived to adolescence
and was making a name for itself, one of its larger competitors had started to
take notice. Slyck Press had approached Dillon with a job offer for substantially
more money than Markwell was paying him.
He tried to rationalize that it was out of some sense of loyalty and fellowship,
but the real reason Dillon went to Frank Samuels, Markwell Publishing's founder
and president, was simple greed; he asked for an increase in pay and benefits above
and beyond what Slyck Press had offered him. If he could use the Slyck Press's offer
as leverage, he hoped he would be able to earn the money he wanted while staying
with coworkers he knew and with a network he architected.
Frank thought about it, but said that he didn't believe the job was worth the kind
of money Dillon was asking for. Dillon was shocked and disappointed when Frank
did not counter. On the spot, Dillon gave his two weeks' notice and left Frank's
office more than a little disgruntled.
He would have simply walked out on the spot, but he decided to do some
"patching" of some computers before moving on to his new position with Slyck
Press. He downloaded some tools to his USB flash drive and proceeded to "update"
a few key systems.
Tuesday, January 10, 2006, 09:08
It was going to be one of those days, apparently. Noah had barely walked to his
desk and sat down when Greg, the head of the advertising sales group, came to
see him.
Noah Chapman had been working in the IT group of Markwell Publishing for
almost three years, but he had just recently been moved up to the position of managing
network administrator and all of the dirty work that entailed when Dillon
McCabe had left the company for a more lucrative position with another publisher.
He would be more impressed with himself, and his promotion, if it weren't for
the fact that only three people were on the IT team, including himself, and his promotion
came by seniority, not by virtue and dedication.
He picked up his Markwell Publishing mug, a company gift for everyone last
Christmas in lieu of real bonuses, and took a sip of his coffee with hazelnut-flavored
creamer. "What can I do for you, Greg?" Noah asked.
"Well, this may sound very strange, but is there any way that Dillon may somehow
be getting information from my computer?" said Greg.
"I am sure it is technically possible. Why do you ask?" said Noah.
"Since he left, we have lost a number of contracts and bids for new business.
Every time we lose, it seems that Slyck Press is the one that beats us, and they seem
to beat us by only a little bit. It just seems too coincidental to me," Greg said. "I think
maybe he is somehow getting information from my computer so that he knows what
we are bidding or what we are offering so they can swipe the business from us."
"OK. Let's go take a look," said Noah.
Noah and Greg walked across the office to the advertising sales team area.
Seated in a small sea of cubicles, with walls just high enough to prevent the team
from making eye contact and being distracted by each other, were approximately 20
employees diligently sending e-mails and placing phone calls to sell ad space in
Markwell Publishing's various magazines.
The two walked past the advertising sales team and into Greg's office. Noah
could hear the power supply and fan and the distinct noise of the hard drive grinding
away as the activity light on the front of Greg's laptop flickered and flashed.
"Can you figure out what is going on?" asked Greg.
"I can't be sure yet. For starters, though, since you think the computer may have
been compromised, I can't trust any of the files or utilities on it. Thankfully, I have a
diagnostics disc with the tools I need. The Helix Live CD tools give me just about
everything I need, and I added a few of my own, too," Noah said. "That way, I can
run my utilities from a known clean CD instead of a suspect computer."
Noah put his diagnostics CD into the computer's CD-ROM drive and opened a
command prompt. He searched his bag of tricks on the diagnostics CD and ran
FPort, a free forensic utility from Foundstone. Foundstone was founded and
run by the authors of McGraw-Hill/Osborne's venerable Hacking Exposed books.
Foundstone had since been purchased by McAfee, but it still operated as a separate
division, and the free utilities that Noah had come to rely on were still available.
C:Fport-2.0>fport
FPort v2.0 - TCP/IP Process to Port Mapper
Copyright 2000 by Foundstone, Inc.
http://www.foundstone.com
Pid
Process
Port
Proto
Path
1060
svchost
135
TCP
C:WINDOWSsystem32svchost.exe
4
System
139
TCP
4
System
445
TCP
1132
svchost
1025
TCP
C:WINDOWSSystem32svchost.exe
4
System
1063
TCP
0
System
3587
TCP
0
System
3588
TCP
0
System
3595
TCP
0
System
3596
TCP
1320
5000
TCP
1320
123
UDP
0
System
123
UDP
0
System
137
UDP
0
System
138
UDP
1060
svchost
445
UDP
C:WINDOWSsystem32svchost.exe
4
System
500
UDP
1132
svchost
1032
UDP
C:WINDOWSsystem32svchost.exe
4
System
1623
UDP
0
System
1900
UDP
0
System
2355
UDP
0
System
3089
UDP
"What is all that gibberish?" Greg inquired.
"This utility will not only show us which TCP and UDP ports are open, but it
will also link them to the applications that are using them so we can identify any
unknown or suspicious ones," Noah explained.
Running FPort didn't lead to any epiphanies, so Noah went back to the diagnostics
CD. This time he ran Process Explorer, a free utility available from Sysinternals.
Process Explorer examines the processes running on the system and maps them to
the handles or dynamic link library (DLL) files that they have open.
"Nothing there either," said Noah. "Perhaps Dillon was more clever than I give
him credit for."
Noah went back to his CD and found a tool called BlackLight, a utility from
F-Secure. "This utility can detect files and processes that are hidden even from the
Windows operating system." Noah was trying to keep Greg informed of what he
was doing.
Noah ran BlackLight and generated the following results:
fsbl-20060211223720.log
(start logfile)
02/11/06
9:37:20
[Info]: BlackLight Engine 1.0.30 initialized
02/11/06
9:37:20
[Info]: OS: XP 5.2.3790 (Service Pack 1)
02/11/06
9:37:22
[Note]: 7019 4
02/11/06
9:37:22
[Note]: 7005 0
02/11/06
9:37:24
[Note]: 7006 0
02/11/06
9:37:24
[Note]: 7011 1448
02/11/06
9:37:25
[Note]: 7018 2032
02/11/06
9:37:25
[Info]: Hidden process: C:rootroot.exe
02/11/06
9:37:25
[Note]: 7018 10180
02/11/06
9:37:25
[Info]: Hidden process: C:Program Files
Internet Exploreriexplore.exe
02/11/06
9:37:25
[Note]: FSRAW library version 1.7.1014
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Info]: Hidden file: C:WINDOWSqservice.exe
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 7002 0
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 7003 1
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 10002 2
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Info]: Hidden file: C:WINDOWSservices.dll
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 10002 2
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Info]: Hidden file: C:WINDOWSJiurlPortHide.sys
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 10002 2
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Info]: Hidden file: C:WINDOWSkurlmon.dll
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 10002 2
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Info]: Hidden file: C:rootBeniOku.txt
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 10002 3
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Info]: Hidden file: C:roothook.dll
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 10002 3
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Info]: Hidden file: C:rootProAgent.exe
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 10002 3
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Info]: Hidden file: C:rootroot.exe
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 10002 3
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Info]: Hidden file: C:rootServer.exe
02/11/06
9:37:48
[Note]: 10002 3
02/11/06
9:37:49
[Note]: 10002 3
02/11/06
9:37:49
[Note]: 10002 3
02/11/06
9:37:49
[Note]: 10002 3
02/11/06
9:37:49
[Note]: 10002 3
02/11/06
9:37:49
[Note]: 10002 3
02/11/06
9:38:14
[Info]: Hidden file: C:WINDOWSsystem32HookApi.dll
02/11/06
9:38:14
[Note]: 10002 2
02/11/06
9:49:38
[Note]: 7007 0
(end logfile)
Noah checked out the BlackLight log and noted some of the hidden files. He did
not recognize anything offhand, so he did a Google search for the first one on the
list -- qservice.exe. Some of the Google results suggested that qservice.exe was related
to a Trojan called ProAgent, which Noah noticed was also one of the hidden files
detected by BlackLight.
"Very sneaky, Mr. McCabe," Noah said, admiring his former boss's creativity.
Noah opened an Internet Explorer web browser window and went to the Trend
Micro virus information website at http://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo. He did a search for ProAgent and came up with the following description:
Description:
This Trojan steals e-mail and Instant Messenger (IM) password from
the affected system. Upon execution, it drops a copy of itself in the Windows
folder and logs the user's keystrokes. It then sends the information to the
remote malicious user via e-mail.
It also creates a registry entry that enables its automatic execution at every
system startup.
"According to this, the ProAgent file detected by BlackLight is sending information
from your computer to an outside e-mail account," Noah explained. "So we
have a pretty good idea of what is going on here and who is responsible for it. I have
a little more investigating to do. After I get more information, we can take our findings
to management I think."
"If you say so," said Greg. "I'm still catching up."
Questions:
What built-in Windows tool could have been used to identify open ports?
How should Markwell Publishing have handled Dillon's departure to
protect against this attack?
How can the company protect its internal systems and data from being
abused through the inappropriate use of USB flash drives?
What else can Markwell Publishing do to try to safeguard its systems
from rootkits?
Does this sound like a problem that could happen or even is happening at your company? Read the next installment of this excerpt from the book Hacker's Challenge, "Solution 9: The root of the problem" to see how Noah and Greg work around this apparent network infiltration.
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